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MASS COMMUNICATIONS 
A N D  ' INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY'  
Frank Webster and  Kevin Robins 
Eighteen hundred thirty-four, the year of Biichner's 
Hessian Courier 
Charles Babbage, obsessive-compulsive, Fellow 
of the Royal Society, founder of operations 
analysis 
conceived the punch card. 
H.M. Enzensberger 'C.B. 1792-1871' 
This article aims to provide an overview of recent developments in 
mass communications made possible by the micro-electronics 're- 
volution'. It sets out to assess the impact of these new technologies 
on social relations-or, more correctly, to analyse the technologies as 
social relations. Thereby it intends to treat them as forms assumed 
by the capital relation as it seeks to impose itself ever more firmly 
and extensively on social life. 
It is today possible to discern a process of convergence and 
integration of once disparate technologies. At one level, hitherto 
independent products are merging into systems within particular 
sectors of society. Word processors, telecommunications equipment 
and computers are becoming key elements of integrated systems in 
the business sector. And video cassettes and discs, television games, 
home computers and viewdata services form key components of 
systems in the home. At a more general level even these systems are 
merging into what may be seen as an over-arching communications 
industry which incorporates, most importantly, computing and 
various forms of telecommunications. This is identified, but not 
conceptualized, by the recently coined term 'information techno- 
logy'. In consequence, corporations once unchallenged within their 
own sphere are being thrown into confrontation with each other. 
Although this process is still embryonic the impact is already being 
felt, most notably with the introduction of word processors. It is 
clear that this impact will increase, not just on employment, but on 
all social relations, permeating many aspects of everyday life. 
However, it is necessary to begin with some brief theoretical 
observations. Because assessments of technological innovation all 
too easily result in futuristic utopian-or dystopian-scenarios, we 
feel it essential that analysis of such developments be conceptually 
informed by more adequate principles than we have yet found 
within the theoretical framework of current Marxist cultural and 
media research. Such work is particularly restrictive when trying to 
understand mass communications phenomena which are only in 
their emergent phases. Indeed, it is our contention that recent 
developments in 'information technology' are calling into question 
many aspects of this research. A re-examination of the'bretical 
positions is required, especially a rethinking of the interrelations 
between social and economic forms and theory and (historical) 
reality. 
The history of Marxist cultural and media theory is inextricably 
linked with the history of the base/superstructure metaphor. This 
metaphor, universally criticized in its cruder and mechanistic 
incarnations, has nevertheless proved singularly irrepressible. Such a 
conceptualization is indeed part of everyday consciousness: i t  does 
indicate the spontaneous perceptions of members of society. It is an 
element of commonsensical modes of thought which make it 
difficult to think the interpenetration of different aspects of society 
in any other way. This phenomenon, which has discernable 
historical origins, has been accepted by and theoretically refurbished 
by that school of thought which now exercises 'hegemony' over 
Marxist cultural studies. This movement gravitates around the 
early texts of Althusser and draws upon particular concepts 
('determination in the last instance', 'overdetermination', etc.) to 
pose anew the relation of base and superstructure (now called the 
'economic' and 'ideological' levels). 
The base/superstructure metaphor, in any of its guises, reflects the 
way in which society appears as fragmented and divided, in which 
culture appears as external to the economic infrastructure, thereby 
reproducing the surface appearances of society. 
On  the one hand, the effect on media studies has been to isolate 
from the social totality the 'level' of ideology or culture. Specialists 
in cultural analysis are able to examine this as the sphere in which 
social relations are produced and reproduced, the sphere in which 
ideology is effective, and in which hegemony is secured. On the 
other hand, this 'culturalism' is complemented by recent analyses 
which examine the economic infrastructure of mass media. This 
work concedes the study of social relations to the 'culturalists', 
contenting itself with the description of ownership and control of the 
media, the business and economic aspects, which are now devoid of 
all social relations. 
'Economism' and 'culturalism' complement-and moreover 
necessitate-each other, reflecting just how insidious is the perm- 
eation of that strained metaphor into both everyday consciousness 
and theoretical elaborations. This permeation is effective-or 
rather subversive-for negative rather than positive reasons. 
That is, because it precludes an understanding of the social whole 
and of the central importance of Marx's concept of the relations 
of production. Unable to respond to 'the relations of production 
in their totality' (Marx), the metaphor becomes reified, and the 
attempt to permutate the possible relations between base and 
superstructure assumes priority. 'That is to say, the analytic 
categories . . have, almost unnoticed, become substantive descript- 
ions, which then take habitual priority over the whole soczal 
process to which, as analytic categories, they are attempting to 
speak'.' 
The dynamics of social production are obscured by those concepts 
which are currently used to theorize the 'superstructure', notably by 
'ideology' and 'culture'. Called upon to explain more than they are 
capable of, these concepts have become transfixed, ossified and 
ahistorical. They no longer illuminate reality, but rather use the 
reality itself to substantiate the validity of the concepts. It is 
precisely such deductivism that has resulted in the relation between 
theory and historical reality being ob~cured.~ 
It is essential that we overcome such fixities of concept, for 
concepts are social constructions; having no claim to exist as 
definitive entities in their own rights, but serving rather as heuristic 
instruments for research, they are shaped by their existence in the 
real historical world. Historical reality is likely to subvert our 
concepts, demanding in consequence that we constantly reassess, 
debate and reshape them in order to respond to emerging pheno- 
mena. For these reasons it is essential to pose the question of history 
within theory itself. 
Our work on 'information technology' focuses upon emerging 
phenomena, upon new technologies and industrial configura- 
tions, and the social relations they embody. 'Information technolo,gyY is 
-. 
decidely not a new recruit to the 'Ideological State Apparatuses' 
just as it is not a desocialized entity belonging to some 
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autonomous economic or technological realm. Rather it is a new 
phase of capital accumulation, situated in a particular historical 
time, which expresses both the social and economic moments of the 
relations of production. 
Potentially, 'information technology' provides the basis for an 
upsurge in prod~ctivity,~ but also-and necessarily-for the re- 
composition of social relations. This will occur through new forms of 
production, new forms of the labour process, but also through new 
patterns of consumption resulting from new capital and consumer 
goods. Satellite communications, video and cable television and 
information banks will create changes in leisure and work patterns, 
in processes of human interaction and communications, in aspects of 
centralization and decentralization, in sensibility and consciousness. 
Processes of convergence in communications have already been 
noted by mass media researchers. Most noteworthy is the work of 
Armand Mattelart and Herbert Schiller. The latter has boldly 
observed that 'the mass media, advertising, public relations, market 
surveys, public opinion polling, and even the school system are 
inseparable components of a communications apparatus fashioned 
to accommodate a privatized production and consumption economy'? 
In a complementary manner, Mattelart has described the integra- 
tion of the electronics, telecommunications, mass media, space and 
defence industries: showing how culture can no longer (if it ever 
could) be treated as an autonomous sphere since the border-lines 
between political, economic, military and cultural affairs are 
weakening.6 These indices of convergence, when combined with the 
technological integration taking place within these sectors, point 
towards an unprecedented concentration of powers. 
Both Schiller and Mattlelart focus primarily on the relation 
between advanced capitalist communications organizations and the -- 
Third World. It is on this international scale, in what has been 
termed 'cultural imperialism', that the significance of recent deve- 
lopments is perhaps most perceptible. Mattelart himself views these 
trends as indicators of 'the contours of the ideological offensive by 
the dominant classes in this stage of international capital accumula- 
tion'.' 
Today the significance is becoming more clear on the domestic 
scene. Especially important to the future of advanced capitalist 
societies are the telecommunications and data processing industries 
from which have developed so much of the new 'information 
technology'. The sphere of information processing, storage and 
distribution has been assigned a priority role in assuring the 
dominance of, particularly, American corporations. The likes of GE, 
IBM, ITT, Xerox, ATT&T, Exxon and RCA have massively 
invested in the production (and use) of the new technologies. US 
interests are pursued by Japanese and Western European organiza- 
tions. These powerful forces present a formidable, perhaps even 
overwhelming, obstacle to any alternative strategies for change. 
'The fusion of economic strength and information control or 
image-making, public opinion formation or call it what you will, is 
the new quintessence of power, international and domestic'? 
An emphasis on information has gained currency in wide circles. 
There is much talk nowadays of the 'Information Age', the 'informa- 
tion Revolution'. In recent months, following the 'discovery' of 
micro-electronics, there has been a new boom in futurology. Once it 
was grasped that the 'chip' is a device whose function is to hold and act 
upon information, that these integrated circuits are cheap and capable 
of application in a whole battery of specific 'information technologies', 
then forecasts about a new era flourished. 
The discussions, predictably, are not posed, in Schiller's terms, as 
a question of power, but instead are seen as the rise of a new 
information-based service economy or a future 'wired society' which 
will provide information on tap. Extravagant claims are made that 
'information technology' provides the basis for another industrial 
revolution, a panacea which will solve political, ecological and 
Third World industrialization problems. 
The academic underpinning for such positions is provided by the 
tenets of 'post-industrial' theorists, the most significant of whom is 
Daniel Bell, which suggest that we are living in a 'knowledge 
s~ciety'.~ Bell's claim, first offered almost a decade ago, that 'if 
capital and labour are the major structural features of industrial 
society, information and knowledge are those of the post-industrial 
society',lO has been given renewed vigour and edge by develop- 
ments in 'information technology'. 
Misguided by his conservative optimism, Bell ignores the fact that 
information is now treated as a commodity in the way capital 
handles the motor car or any other saleable product. At the same 
time, he seems unaware that 'information technology', used in its 
present form, while it may extend the quantity of 'knowledge' in 
circulation, provides no necessarily qualitative improvement, but 
rather leads to the mechanization of 'knowledge'. It routinizes and 
downgrades much mental labour. Nevertheless, despite the inade- 
quacies of Bell, his provocative theses have provided a guiding light 
for many enthusiasts of the future 'Information Age'. 
For James Martin, the ideologue of the 'wired society', 'Man will 
have the opportunity to once again become civilized in a "post- 
industrial" society.'" In this 'satellite age democracy' it will be 
possible to 'build a world without pollution, without massive 
destruction of nature's beauty,,without human drudgery'.12 Martha 
Williams claims that i t  is now feasible 'to couple information 
research with high technology to help us to utilize the world's 
information resources to solve the pressing problems of science and 
society'.13 For John McHale we are on the verge of post-industrial 
society, one based on technologies of a 'Third Industrial Revolu- 
tion', which are relatively 'non-resource depletive, extremely econo- 
mical in their energy uses and have correspondingly low impacts on 
the environment'. In this society there will also exist 'the possibilities 
of widening participation in decisions and policies through more 
direct citizen interaction via information systems'.I4 
All this, of course, is based upon a rather naive estimation of 
'information technology'-indeed of technology tout court. It is 
reminiscent of the belief in the efficacy of the Ltechnological fix' so 
popular in the sixties. O n  the premise that 'the collection and 
exchange of information underlies all that we do, and the structures 
and functions of industrial societies depend absolutely on its prompt 
and ample supply'15 it is possible to see quantitative increases in the 
provision of 'information technology' as a solution to the world's 
problems. However, such a vision simply overlooks the reality that 
information is inseparably connected to the distribution of social, 
economic and political power. , 
If we may reject the claims made for a post-industrial 'knowledge 
society' we must nevertheless still seriously examine the issue of 
information. Bell correctly emphasizes that information today is a 
strategic resource, that 'post-industrial society is organized around 
knowledge, for the purpose of social control and the directing of 
innovation and change'.16 Irrespective of his misinterpretations, Bell 
has identified an  important phenomenon. His emphasis on the 
transforming power of the service sector, the number of 'knowledge 
workers', expenditure on research and development, etc.,17 is 
mistaken. Against this, we would argue that the significance of 
information lies in directions other than those delineated by Daniel 
Bell, that what is central is the increasing subsumption of know- 
ledge/information under the capital relation, which is facili- 
tated by the new electronic means of storage and distribution. This 
represents an extension of the separation of mental and manual 
labour to society as a whole; it is a question of the form being 
assumed by information as an aspect of the social relations of power. 
That information will become an overriding social and political 
issue is clear from a recent Conservative Party draft policy 
document which declares that 'Britain needs to profit from informa- 
tion just as one and two centuries ago we created wealth from the 
agricultural and industrial revoluti~ns'.'~ It continues: 
The battle lines are already being drawn for the struggle to 
control information in Britain. Government administration, 
worker collectives, corporations, police and security forces, and 
foreign corporations and Governments all seek to preserve their 
own privacy while finding out as much as possible about every 
one else. Information is the commanding height of tomorrow's 
economy. 
We argue, in the following, that apparently disparate technologies 
-teletext, viewdata, electronic mail, data banks, word processors or 
cable television-must actually be considered as components of an 
extensive communications network, as yet only in the early stages of 
its formation, which is being brought about by the process of 
integration and convergence referred to above. By its advocates this 
has been called the 'wired society', a term ,which obscures and 
neutralizes the social and economic logic of what is a new phase of 
accumulation, entailing new forms of production and consumption, 
and a new role for communications in the organization and 
definition of social relations. This phase will develop through the 
struggles between IBM, AT&T, Xerox, etc., to define the contours 
of the new communications system, thereby to control it; and it will 
develop through struggles between these corporations and those 
producers and consumers who will have to coFe to terms with 
these new technologies. The outcome of these struggles can 
scarcely be predicted. But they will be intense, for at stake is the 
establishment of what Daniel Bell appropriately calls an 'infra- 
structure'. 
The Director of the Japan Computer Usage Development Centre 
has outlined the growth of'information technology' in four stages. A 
period of innovatory and pure research with space and defence 
applications (1945-70) was followed by a second, kanagement- 
based stage' (1955-80) in which government and privqe enterprise 
seek to rationalize management. In the third, 'society-based stage', 
the objectives are to develop the social usages of 'information 
technology' (e.g., telemedicine, computer-aided learning) (1970-90). 
Finally, the 'individual-based stage' (1980-2000), sees the installa- 
tion of home terminals and thereby private applications of the 
techno1ogy.lg In this article we consider the second and fourth 
stages, business systems and home systems, as being central. For the 
purposes of analysis we discuss them separately, beginning with 
business systems, which have, for obvious reasons, taken off first, 
laying the infrastructure within which home system<-and indeed 
the mass media-will be recomposed as parts of a more extensive 
(mass) communications and information network. It must be borne 
in mind, of course, that the technological and chronological 
precedence of business systems is by no means absolute, that home 
and business systems increasingly influence one another, as they, 
increasingly, seem to be fusing into a single network. 
It is also important to stress two further points both of which we 
lack the space to develop here.*O First, it must be emphasized that 
these new technologies have a history. Secondly, these origins are 
integrally related to the history of micro-electronics, which is the 
enabling technologf for recent  development^.^^ 
Business Systems 
This section begins by looking at  some of the central business 
services and products being developed. The discussion will be 
followed by a survey of the struggles being waged by rival 
corporations to developsand gain acceptance for their own informa- 
tion systems. 
Business services will primarily consist of computer/communica- 
tion systems which use a range of telecommunications equipment 
(cable, satellite, microwave, etc.) and a range of computer time and 
equipment sharing techniques in order to provide services to 
customers relating to information, data processing and, of increasing 
importance, text handling. In the words of a Department of 
Industry report, 
the running of even a moderately industrialized economy 
requires the collection, storing, retrieving, processing and general- 
ly moving around of a great variety of information, numerical or 
otherwise, often in large volumes and often very quickly. The 
computer makes the first four of these activities possible on a scale 
which was unthinkable a generation ago . . . The telecommunica- 
tions system makes the transportation of information possible on 
the scale required . . .22 
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Among such services offered by 'information utilities' are time- 
shared remote computing, computer-aided learning, message deli- 
very, information retrieval from remote data bases, and funds 
transfers.23 
The Automated Ofice 
Central to the economic development of 'information technology' is 
the office, which, it is projected, will evolve on the basis of new 
developments in micro-electronics towards the 'paperless' or 'auto- 
mated' office. The rationale for automation of the office lies in the 
attempt to increase productivity in this sector which is characterized 
by high labour-intensity in handling huge volumes of information. 
This 'economic' goal is inseparable from the 'social' question of 
control over work and the Labour process in offices. That  this is a 
strategic market, and potentially a lucrative one, is made clear by 
the prominence of such corporations as Philips, 3M, Burroughs, 
Eastman Kodak, ExxonZ4, IBM and Xerox-with the latter two 
having already fully developed strategies for the 'office of the 
future'. In Britain GEC has recently acquired the American office 
equipment manufacturer, A. B. Dick, and the NEB has now formed 
Nexos Office Systems in order to attack the integrated office system 
market. 
At present the main component and cornerstone of office automa- 
tion is the word p;ocessor (WP), by which is meant electronic 
equipment for the preparation, editing, storage and retrieval of text. 
WP equipment exists in various degrees of complexity, the simplest 
being merely an electric typewriter with a magnetic storage device 
(e.g., the IBM 'selectric' typewriter), which allows the operator to 
correct, add, delete and modify information electronically without 
erasing it. This is, and will remain for some time, the most prevalent 
form of WP precisely because it bestows greater 'efficiency' upon 
secretarial and typing work. 
More complex WP systems are computer-based, being either 
'stand alone' (mini-computer) devices or connected to in-house or 
remote mainframe computers. The more sophisticated machines 
have a visual display unit (VDU) for text entry and editing, 
increased memory capacity, a micro-processor unit for more elabor- 
ate editing facilities, and a high speed printer for producing hard 
copies.25 It is only when WPs have access to large memories and 
when they have communications capabilities that their full poten- 
tial is realized; they become then the basis for electronic memos 
and files, and for an  alternative inter-office message system (i.e., 
electronic mail). When WPs are linked to each other and to 
computers by means of a telecommunications system they become 
true communicating word processors (CWPS).~~ They cease to be 
elaborate typewriters and become computer terminals within a 
complete office automation system.27 
As yet CWPs have not been developed systematically, and even in 
the United States less than 10 per cent of WPs have communicating 
facilities. However, it is evident that the evolution of text processing 
systems into communication networks is only a matter of time. 
Many PTTs are exploring an advanced text-communication service, 
named Teletex, which is designed to supersede telex and integrate 
with developments in CWPs. Already West Germany and Sweden 
are planning CWP (or Teletex) networks'under PTT auspices.28 
And the CCITT, the international standards organization for 
- 
telephony and telegraphy, is attempting to establish standards for a 
Teletex system that will allow the message and data facilities of 
CWPs to operate over public data networks.29 
Electronic Mail 
CWPs clearly provide one strong basis for an electronic mail service 
(EMS), but the term in fact refers to a much broader range of 
electronic message communications. The most.common at present is 
facsimile transmission, which, along with enhanced telex, forms an 
intermediate step towards true electronic mail, i.e., computer to 
computer communications. The British Post Office is now planning 
to lease facsimile machines, whilst the French government has made 
a much more positive commitment to facsimile. The US Postal 
Service is negotiating with several European PTTs over the 
possibility of introducing an international facsimile service called 
Intelpost, whilst within the United States it is planning a more 
advanced service, Electronic Computer-Originated Mail (ECOM), 
in which 'letters' are electronically generated and transmitted to a 
destination post office, where they are converted to hard copy and 
delivered.30 
True EMSs-those which operate an end to end electronic 
service-have their origin in message dialogues between experienced 
users of data communications networks such as the Arpanet system. 
Such systems, which remain internal to one particular network, 
have, however, also been made available by Tymshare, with its On  
Tyme message-switching service, and by the Telenet data network 
with a similar service. It is the establishment of data networks that 
in fact offers an infrastructure for EMSs, and the Post Office's 
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decision to go ahead with its public packet-switched data service 
(PSS) is a step in the direction of computer mail. The logical 
extension comes when this is the infrastructure not only for CWPs, 
but also for Prestel terminals, in which case electronic mail can be 
directed straight to the home. 
As yet EMSs are in their embryonic stages, though it has been 
estimated that computer mail should be cost competitive with 
postage by the mid 1980s. A report by Communications Studies and 
Planning, and Mackintosh Consultants, claims that annual EMS 
sales will rise from $1 80 million in 1978 to $1 100 million in 1987 in 
Europe, and during the same period in the United States from $350 
million to $1400 million. 
Electronic Funds Transfers 
(EFT) refers to the electronic implementation of financial transac- 
tions, or, as James Martin puts it, 'EFT recognises that money is 
merely a form of inf~rmation.'~' Martin goes on to delineate four 
types of EFT, 'representing successive steps towards an EFT society'. 
The first involves transfers of money between banks, and is by far 
the most common. Examples of this are the Bank Wire I1 network in 
the United States, which transmits funds transfer messages, miscel- 
laneous reimbursement messages and administrative messages, and, 
on the international level, the SWIFT network22 3he latter leases 
private communication lines to offer high speed transmission of 
money, messages and bank statements between banks in North 
America and Western Europe. One obvious advantage of such 
systems, beyond the reduction of paper work, is that they speed up 
the circulation of money, such 'high velocity money' making it 
possible to utilize capital that would otherwise be idle.33 
Martin's second type of EFT refers to transfers between the 
computers of other corporations and bank computers, whilst the 
third describes banking terminals for cash dispensing. The fourth 
type, least developed but potentially of greatest significance, is the 
electronic point of sale (POS) terminal, which would allow 
customers in shops and restaurants to directly debit their accounts in 
payment for g0ods.3~ A logical consequence of this would be the use 
of domestic Prestel terminals for the same purpose. 
Data Banks, remotely accessed via telecommunications links, are now 
becoming major elements within communications networks. The 
first commercial applications were those providing rapidly changing 
information of value to business, such as rail and airline reservation 
systems and stock market quotation services. Through initiatives by 
governments and large corporations, applications are extending 
inexorably to such specialized forms of information as credit reports, 
market research information, legal and medical files, health and 
demographic information, police records, e t ~ . ~ ~  
It is at this corporate level that one can see the power invested in 
the organization of and access to information-for this information, 
important because of the commercial and political uses to which it 
may be put, is treated as proprietary and sold only to those with 
large resources, i.e., business, governments and scientific establish- 
ments36 The inaccessibility of such information has created what is 
becoming a major political issue. The readiness of large corporations 
to violate 'data privacy' and their ability to convey information 
across national borders37 led Sweden, for example, to pass a Data 
Act (1973) to control the export of data files. This example has been 
followed by eighteen more countries. Such electronically conveyed 
information is, of course, extremely difficult to monitor. 
A second kind of data bank is that which 'helps a scientist, 
technician, administrator, librarian, information specialist or other 
intermediary locate information rapidly and precisely . . . '38, namely 
that which stores bibliographical and scientific-technical academic 
information. It is this kind of system that has been used to generate 
the ideology of free and unbounded access to information for all 
scholars. The 'on-line information revolution' began in the United 
States in the early seventies, reaching Britain in 1976 when 
American systems were relayed via international networks such as 
Telenet and Tymnet. Most of the world's fifteen or so major on-line 
retrieval services are in fact situated in the US, the pre-eminent ones 
being Lockheed Information Systems and Systems Development 
Corporation (SDC).39 
In view of the European dependence on American telecommuni- 
cations, computers and data bases (with about 100 available on the 
major systems) the Council of Ministers of the Commission of the 
European communities initiated in 1975 an action plan to establish 
a data transmission network providing access to databanks within 
the EEC. The packet-switched data network, now called Euronet, 
and the array of data banks, designated DIANE, are due to 
commence operations in late 1979, providing what has been called 
'a common market in the field of scientific, technical, economic, 
legal and social inf~rmat ion ' .~~ 
The two kinds of data bank eferred to so far are aimed at the 
commercial and government markets, but there is a third kind, the 
data bank accessed to a domestic viewdata terminal (see below) 
which is oriented towards the private consumer. Such a system will 
offer less sensitive information, being primarily concerned with 
forms of electronic publishing and with advertising and sales 
functions. Such is the disparity between Departments I and I1 of the 
economy. 
The services we have described-and those to be discussed in the 
following section-are transmitted through various telecommunica- 
tion channels, most notably telephone cables, co-axial cables, 
microwave radio, communication satellite channels and optical 
fibres. These channels could coexist and reinforce one another, but 
are in fact becoming the vehicles in a struggle between the giant 
electronics corporations for control of the 'information infrastruc- 
ture'. It is the American experience that shows most dramatically 
the way in which the communications aspect has come to the fore in 
the struggle to capitalize on 'information technology'. Competition 
has become acute in the 1970s with the arrival of new kinds of 
common carrier in competition with the telephone companies (i.e., 
mainly AT&T). In August 1969, the US Federal Communica- 
tions Commission (FCC) allowed Microwave Communications 
Inc. (MCI) to set up a public microwave system between St Louis 
and Chicago, a system which soon extended nationwide. And 
the now defunct Datran was also permitted to develop a micro- 
wave data communications system. In 1972 the FCC initiated its 
'open skies' policy, authorizing common carriers to construct 
and operate satellite systems for domestic telecommunic~tions. 
At present, there are five satellite carriers: the American Satellite 
Corporation, RCA Americom, SBS, Comsat General, and Western 
Union. 
In the United States, James Martin distinguishes five different 
kinds of organization providing data networks. 
1. Established Telephone Administrations-an example being 
AT&T7s Dataphone Digital Service (DDS), which was deve- 
loped as a result of competitive 'innovations by specialized 
common carriers; 
2. Specialized Common Carriers (e.g., MCI, Datran, the satellite 
companies); 
3. Value-Added Common Carriers (VACCs), which add com- 
puters to existing links in order to enhance the services which 
can be offered to end users (e.g., Telenet, Tymnet, Graphnet); 
4. Private corporations; 
5. Service corporations (e.g., SWIFT).'Z 
Since the importance of the last two has already been made clear we 
shall here concentrate on the first three types, where the battle to 
establish a public data network architecture is being waged. 
This struggle took off in 1968 when the regulatory climate began 
to favour competition and thereby to open up the question of 
whether data communications would operate through the telephone 
network or through a separate infrastructure. During this period 
there has been a continuous erosion of AT&T's monopoly position 
over the phone system, initiated by the 1968 Carterfone decision 
which permitted the connection of terminal equipment to AT&T's 
lines.43 Also of significance were the above mentioned decisions to 
allow specialized common carriers to compete with the phone 
company. 
. . 
The major protagonists in the data communications war are 
AT&T and IBM, with Xerox, ITT and the VACCs playing 
important supporting roles. Standing at the frontier where telecom- 
munications and data processing meet, IBM and AT&T are now 
preparing to invade each other's hitherto sacrosanct territory and 
defend their own. AT&T is trying to enter the data processing 
business, and to keep all but carriers out of the telecommunications 
field, whilst IBM feels the need to ensure that its products have a 
communications link on which to operate and thereby guarantee 
the viability of its planned 'office of the future'.44 
AT&T launched a major assault in July 1978 when it announced 
a projected Advanced Communications Service (ACS), still in the 
planning stage, but intended to provide for a shared data communi- 
cations network, the interfacing of incompatible terminals and 
computers, various data communications' facilities, and overall 
maintenance and management of the network. This would create a 
national communications facility on the same scale and model as 
the phone service, giving also the possibility of text transmission, 
electronic mail and electronic office functions. Through its system, 
which uses relatively standard techniques and aims at a large 
marketplace, AT&T is seeking to take network protocols and 
architecture out of the hands of computer vendors and put them 
into the telecommunications.network.45 
The major obstacle in AT&T's way is that as a common carrier it 
is precluded by law from providing data processing services. AT&T 
is arguing that its system does not qualify as data processing because 
the substantive content of messages is unchanged. But clearly 
AT&T-forced into a defensive position within its own telecom- 
munications sphere and involved in massive anti-trust legisla- 
tion-is taking the offensive. As IBM's Lewis Branscomb has 
observed, ACS 'moves far down the path toward the offering of data 
processing services by a monopoly carrier'.46 In so doing it is clearly 
on a collision course with IBM. A recent commentator has noted 
that ACS 'marks the long-awaited declaration of commercial war 
between IBM and Bell IBM recognizes the challenge and sees 
itself as able to respond across the board-in computing, in 
telecommunications, and in office a ~ t o r n a t i o n ' . ~ ~  
IBM's response has been to enter the satellite communication 
market through the formation of Satellite Business Systems (SBS) 
which it jointly owns with Comsat General and Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co. Facing competition in its traditional market, IBM is 
eager to get into new businesses and aims through SBS to provide a 
communications service for the few hundred large US corporations 
and government departments with high data transmission rates and 
dedicated satellites. SBS is due to be launched in the 1980s and will 
offer such services as teleconferencing, inter-computer communica- 
tions and high-speed facsimile transmission. The major obstacle for 
SBS is, however, the same as for ACS-legislati~n.~~ 
In November 1978 Xerox launched its challenge when it disclosed 
plans for a data communications network, to be available in the 
early 1980s, which would use leased satellite capacity combined 
with local microwave radio links. The service, named Xtex1,4~ will 
provide document distribution, data communications and telecon- 
ferencing facilities. This system, which represents a diversification 
away from Xerox's traditional business and a move towards the 
'office of the future', is aimed, like ACS, at a broad market, but will 
operate with high speed transmission like SBS. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind the challenge from the 
VACCs, such as Tymnet and Telenet, which provide enhanced 
services through the existing telephone network. Significantly, 
Telenet has recently been merged with General Telephone and 
Electronics Corp. (GTE) in order to strengthen its hand in the 
oncoming struggle with ACS, SBS and Xten. 
The example of the United States provides, then, an indication of 
the real struggles and upheavals, only now beginning to take shape, 
which underpin the convergence of computers and telecommunica- 
tions. In Britain developments have been more muted, largely due 
to the monopoly position and legislative powers of 'the most 
important single business in Britain'50, the Post Office. There is, 
however, a strong lobby aimed at relaxing the Post Office monopo- 
ly, notably from the Conservative Party which wants to permit 'the 
establishment of "value added services" on lines leased from the Post 
Office by private companies'-such services would include facsimile, 
teleconferencing and message collection and d i s t r i b ~ t i o n . ~ ~  What is 
certain, though, is that in Britain and the US the development of 
electronic business systems is on the agenda, and that this develop- 
ment will be structured and guided by corporate rather than 
democratic processes. It is in this context of the ongoing convergence 
of telecommunications and computers that we must now look at 
domestic systems. 
Domestzc Infoormatzon Systems 
The invasion of the consumer electronics field by 'in- 
formation technology' is still at an early and tentative stage. How- 
ever, just as computing and telecommunications are converging 
with various types of office equipment to form business systems, 
so too are they converging with domestic electronics equip- 
ment to create 'home entertainment systems' which will in- 
corporate television, video equipment, home computers, television 
games, teletext and viewdata. As yet these two types of system are 
distinct, but it is seemingly inevitable that they will tend increas- 
ingly to integrate, with the manufacture of consumer systems being 
one division within an integral 'intelligent' electronics (i.e., compu- 
ter/communications) industry. The extent to which this happens 
rests on the outcome of the impending struggles between existing 
consumer electronics companies, particularly television manu- 
facturers and other sectors of the electronics industry which are 
seeking to penetrate the lucrative consumer markets-notably 
computer, (micro-)electronics components and telecommunications 
interests. 
Just as the pivot for the electronic office will be the (communicat- 
ing) word processor, so that for the 'electronic home' will be the 
television set, enhanced to become a 'video entertainment centre' 
and, eventually, a form of computer terminal. The whole strategy 
for bringing 'information technology' into the home is premised on 
the fact that television sets are already installed in most households. 
It has been estimated that 97 per cent of British homes have 
televisions, that there are some 24 million sets currently installed, of 
which two-thirds are colour, and that there will be about 80 per cent 
colour television penetration by the early 1980~.~l  Because even the 
market for colour sets is approaching saturation, and because sales 
have been in decline since 1975, television manufacturers have been 
trying to find ways to enhance television sets. As the first generation 
of colour sets, bought in the early seventies, comes up for replace- 
MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND 'INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY' 30 1 
ment, customers are now being offered additional features such as 
teletext and remote control. 
But is is not just the television manufacturing industry that is 
aiming to amplify the capabilities of the television set. Micro- 
electronics component manufacturers see television as the basis for 
developments that will supersede the pocket calculator and digital 
watch markets-video games and teletext decoders being obvious 
applications for 'chip' technology. The Post Office is aiming to 
extend its telecommunications services by using the television 
console as a computer terminal. Teletext services provide the 
foundation for using television as a channel for 'electronic publish- 
ing'. It has been said that 'in its forty year history, the role of the 
domestic television receiver has not changed at all. Its sole function 
is to show programmes distributed from a central point for mass 
consumption . . . essentially television is as it was when the BBC first 
started broadcasting from Alexandra Palace.'52 The development of 
viewbta, video equipment and new cable television services is 
bringing this phase in the history of television to a close. 
In our view the key element for initiating a new phase will be the 
viewdata service, transforming the T V  set into a computer terminal 
linked to a very extensive data network, and becoming increasingly 
the centre around which other new products and services will 
cohere. Important in this context is the fact that it is viewdata that 
will form a bridge between business and domestic information 
systems. We have already suggested that electronic message services, 
EFT and data banks find their domestic extension with the 
viewdata terminal. The implications of this are that the 'viewdata 
terminal of the future will not be an adapted television set but an 
"all-purpose" computer terminal linked to the user's own network 
for word processing and the like, and possibly also to international 
data netw0rks'.~3 
Of the other products that we discuss, personal computers will 
absorb video games, and then probably enter into competition with 
viewdata systems, which will be seeking to fulfil a similar function. 
The extent to which they will compete-or even become integra- 
ted-remains uncertain. Cable television is significant in so far as 
particular developments in the United States, where telephone 
companies are legally barred from providing data processing 
services, show that cable may well provide an alternative trans- 
mission channel to telephone wires for a viewdata service. Finally, 
we see video equipment as augmenting the traditional role of tele- 
vision as an entertainment medium, but also, through the dense 
information storage capacity of the video disc, developing into an 
alternative medium for the dissemination of information. The 
extent to which all these new products coexist or compete with each 
other rests on many variables. We can be sure, though, that 
television is being restructured as an aspect of 'information techno- 
logy'. As a Philips representative has commented: 'We're on the 
edge of an information explosion which is going to give a big boost 
to the electronics industry, because' audio and T V  will have to 
become part of the home information system.'54 Such systems aim to 
provide a range of information and entertainment services that will 
intensify media consumption. 
Viewdata and Teletext 
There are three major channels for dissemination of electronic 
information. The first is the use of wide-band cables, such as is used 
by cable television services, and we discuss this below. A second 
method is that of narrow-band broadcasting, usually called teletext, 
in which graphic and textual information is inserted into the spare 
lines of broadcast television signals. An early version of this was the 
RCA Home Facsimile System, developed in the mid 1960s, which 
broadcast data in a television signal for hard-copy reproduction by 
an electrostatic printer associated with a TV receiver. More recently 
the BBC and IBA have introduced full teletext services, called 
Ceefax and Oracle respectively, which transmit digitally encoded 
information to be picked up by a special decoder in the television 
set, stored in an electronic memory, and generated as words and 
symbols on the screen. The success of establishing teletext as a full 
public service rests on the early agreement between the BBC and the 
IBA to unify teletext standards, and upon the willingness of set 
manufacturers to develop silicon chip decoders. Although in early 
1978 there were only 8000 teletext sets in operation, it is estimated 
that by 1985 7 million households will receive the teletext service.55 
Further success will depend upon such innovations as a printer for 
copying teletext pages, and the development of 'telesoftware', by 
which is meant the capability to broadcast computer programmes to 
a receiver modified to function as a domestic computer.56 
Teletext, however, does have limitations, the most important of 
which are that the number of 'pages' of information that it can 
broadcast is restricted and that it is only a 'one-way' service with no 
facility for interaction with the information bank. Such limitations 
do not apply to the third kind of channel for data dissemination, the 
narrow-band cable system, known as videotex or viewdata, which 
uses the telephone cable network to allow an interactive service. 
Besides allowing a more sophisticated use of a central data bank, 
viewdata also permits such extra 'active' functions as message 
transmission and EFT services. As such it threatens to make teletext 
red~ndant .~ '  
The first and best know viewdata system is that pioneered by the 
British Post Office and now registered as Prestel. It was inaugurated 
as an experimental system in September 1975, and opened as a 
public service in London in March 1979. The Post Office has now 
spent £1 7 million on development, and plans to spend another £18 
million over the next two years. Prestel, which was designed to be 
compatible with teletext protocols, is intend'ed to be cheap, standar- 
dized and easy to operate.58 Information for Prestel's data bank is 
supplied by independent 'information producers', ranging from 
educational institutions to retail companies, and from news media 
to charity organizations, for whom the Post Office acts as a common 
carrier. Unlike teletext, there is no technical limit to the amount of 
data Prestel can handle, and even at this early stage its present 163 
competing suppliers of information are providing 122,000 'pages'.59 
As yet Prestel has not taken off in any big way, with sets still 
costing £1200, and there are only an estimated 1000 viewdata sets 
installed. Mackintosh consultants calculate that there will be about 
300,000 installations by 1985, but stress that viewdata is a product 
for the 1990s rather than the 1980~.~O The main objective for the Post 
Office at present is to gain international acceptance for Prestel, both 
by selling it abroad-which it has done in Germany, Holland, Hong 
Kong and Switzerland-and by having it accepted as the internat- 
ional standard for viewdata equipment. Already other countries are 
developing similar systems, notably Canada, France, West Ger- 
many, Japan and Sweden. The French system, Antiope, represents a 
particular threat to Prestel, in that it combines teletext and 
viewdata into one system and could also integrate easily with 
business systems such as CWPs and the data bases to be linked by 
Euronet.G1 
The flexibility and potential of viewdata is illustrated by the 
variety of services it will provide. The major function is to provide 
information (topical, reference, professional, commercial, etc.) 
which, because Prestel is interactive, can be tailored to the 
particular needs of individual users. Secondly, viewdata is a message 
communication medium. Although at present the message service is 
rudimentary, it could provide the basis for an electronic mail service 
between subscribers. Thirdly, it can provide the basis for domestic 
EFT services, allowing users to make purchases of goods sold 
through viewdata networks. A fourth possibility is that the viewdata 
computers could be used for providing a calculations service- 
although the development of 'telesoftware' is a more likely prospect. 
A UK firm called CAP has produced a form of computer software 
that can be transmitted down telephone lines and stored in suitably 
adapted Prestel receivers. This endows the Prestel terminal with 
'intelligence', turning it into a personal computer.62 
Although Prestel was originally aimed at the general public it 
would seem that its emphasis has now shifted to the commercial 
environment. It would seem that its business applications will lead 
increasingly to its incorporation into business information networks. 
Recently the Post Office waived the rule that only T V  receivers 
could link with Prestel; in consequence firms other than television 
manufacturers can make equipment for the viewdata system. Now 
electronics firms are also manufacturing private viewdata systems 
specifically for the business market-Philips has already produced a 
system, and Pye, STC and GEC are working on such equipment. It 
seems prob~bde that computing and telecommunications interests 
will see viewdata as a profitable field for investment, and that 
initially the business market will be the target for exploitation. 
Video Games and Personal Computers 
The progress of video games reflects the rapid changes in micro- 
electronics technology in the 1970s. The first consumer video games 
were marketed (by Magnavox) in the United States in 1972. By 
1975 the development of special purpose integrated circuits made 
possible the incorporation of several games into one package. We 
have now reached the third generation of games, which are based on 
micro-processors (i.e., very small computers), and can be 
programmed to play many different games by inserting 'software' 
packages. The success of video games is illustrated by the rise in UK 
sales from 95,000 in 1976 to 625,000 units in 1978, with program- 
mable games taking a growing market share.63 
What is most important in the context of this article is the fact 
that the upmarket video game is becoming indistinguishable from 
the personal computer. Commodore's PET home computer, for 
example, is based on a micro-processor similar to that used in 
Fairchild's video games unit. Personal computers, first marketed in 
March 1975, represent the replacement market not only for 
electronic games but also for pocket calculators. Launched initially 
as enhanced video games, the personal computer will be aimed not 
only at the domestic market, but increasingly at the business and 
professional sector. In 1978 250,000 were sold and this figure is 
expected to rise to 500,000 in 1979. Given such an expanding 
market it is not surprising that companies like Hewlett-Packard, 
Sharp, Siemens, Texas Instruments and Toshiba are establishing 
their positions, whilst General Electric, IBM and RCA have plans to 
enter the field.'j4 
In the attempt to bring 'information technology' into the home, 
personal computers present a serious rival to viewdata systems 
(particularly in America). Developments are under way to link them 
to television screens and to provide them with communications 
facilities. The FCC, indeed, intends to encourage the use of personal 
computer networks for electronic mail services. As viewdata systems 
and personal computer networks come to look increasingly alike,65 
we can be sure that there will be a long period of conflict in which 
each will attempt t o  aspert its supremacy in the single long-term 
market for which both are competing. 
Cable Television 
James Martin has said that 'few media have a greater potential for 
changing the culture of a society than the co-axial cables being laid 
into homes by the cable television cornpanie~'.~G Since the early 
1950s, when cable television was first developed in areas with poor 
broadcast reception, ambitious claims have often been made for its 
potential. Here we are restricted to looking at cable television only 
in so far as it converges with developments in 'information 
technology'. What is so important about the co-axial cables used in 
wired television is their enormous information-carrying capacity. 
This permits not only many extra programme channels (currently 
up to thirty with more to become available with improvements 
introduced by optical fibre cables), but also additional services such 
as telephone and viewphone facilities, meter reading, electronic mail 
delivery, fire detection alarms, and access to computers.67 The 
nature of the cable, as opposed to broadcasting, also allows it to 
operate in both directions, and thus to provide an interactive 
service. It is such versatility that gives cable an undisputed long 
term potential, and, moreover, makes it a rival to viewdata. 
This applies particularly to the United States, which has some 
4000 cable systems reaching over 13 million homes. Since 1968, 
when regulatory restrictions on cable T V  began to be lifted, there 
have been indicatons that some of cable's potential, including a 
viewdata service, may well be fulfilled. This would, of course, be in 
the hands of the large conglomerates now controlling cable systems. 
The most developed example, which also highlights the corporate 
aspect of cable, is the Warner Communications' QUBE system 
located in Columbus, Ohio. This system provides thirty channels: 
ten television stations, ten pay-TV channels and ten 'community 
channels' providing local programmes and text information. The 
subscriber is provided with a hand-held control unit with which he 
is able to select programmes for which he pays a t  differential rates. 
His request is processed by one of four computers, which also 
prepares a monthly bill. QUBE also allows viewers to 'talk back' to 
the studio by pushing buttons on their control units-in this way 
they can vote on programmes or make bids in televised auctions. In 
addition to this pseudo-participation, Warners are planning to add 
such facilities as fire and burglar alarms linked from subscribers' 
houses to the central computers.68 
What such a system could become is foreshadowed in the Osaka 
suburb of Higashi-Ikoma, where a cable system using fibre optic 
cables has a camera and microphone installed in subscribers' homes 
to permit 'true' two-way television. This project is in fact a test-bed 
for the 'wired city', and is actively supported by such companies as 
Matsushita, Fujitsu, Toshiba, and by the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry. Additional services, for instance electronic text 
transfers, will be added by the 1 9 9 0 ~ . ~ ~  Another pro~ect, begun as 
early as 1972 at Tama, a satellite town of Tokyo, uses co-axial cables 
to offer subscribers reception of video programmes, computer-aided 
learning, data retrieval, seat reservation, tele-metering, facsimile and 
other 
Video 
Cable and video are the most recent entertainment media, and as 
such, will be components in the evolving domestic informatiorden- 
tertainment systems. Although they may come to coexist, they are in 
many ways rivals in the attempt to bypass broadcasting and supply 
commercial entertainment to television owners. Video may well 
have the edge in that its means of dissemination is especially simple 
and requires no expensive infrastructure. This is both the strength 
and weakness of video. Lacking any need for a foundation on 
a telecommunications network (though utilizable within one) it 
is operable without massive capital investment. At the same 
time, precisely because it does not possess this telecommunic- 
ations element probably limits its long-term role in an area where 
the latter is a critical prerequisite for the integration which will 
allow the production of comprehensive systems for the home. 
Despite this, video is currently taking off rapidly. Video tape/cas- 
sette recorders are at present being extensively marketed as a logical 
complement to the television. These extensions of traditional T V  are 
limited in what they offer. They allow chiefly the manipulation of 
viewers' time along with the opportunity to purchase pre-packaged 
video materials (e.g., golf tuition, soft p~rnography) .~~  As such, they 
are of less significance than the more versatile video disc. 
Throughout the 1970s there have been attempts to develop and 
market a videodisc. Except for the unsuccessful Telefunken-Decca 
(TelDec) disc launched prematurely in 1975, the first commercially 
viable disc first went on sale in Atlanta, Georgia in December 1978. 
This Philips MCA disc may well come into fierce competition with 
any of the forty or so discs now being developed w o r l d - ~ i d e . ~ ~  
Because these videodiscs all have different systems and standards, 
and are therefore incompatible with each other, a race is now on to 
establish a product that will become the industry standard. That the 
stakes are high73 is testified by the presence in the field of such major 
corporations as Philips, RCA, Sony, Thomson-CSF, JVC and 
Mitsubishi. 
There are several important points to be made about the videodisc. 
The first is that is is a significant new entertainment medium. It will be 
a cheap complement to the LP record: currently a disc version of Jaws 
costs as little as £7. The second, and more important, point is that the 
disc is also an instrument for publishing and information storage. The 
Philips optical-laser videodisc is able to provide a freeze-frame facility 
with, at present, the capacity for 54,000 still frames. This means that it 
could develop as an electronic book. The production of cheap 
throwaway discs could make it an electronic form of journalism and 
adverti~ing.~' Moreover, this dense information storage capacity makes 
the disc a very promising information medium. IBM and Xerox, for 
example, are reported to be working on videodisc systems, probably for 
the purpose of storing commercial and industrial data.75 Already the 
US Department of Defence is making use of the Philips/MCA disc 
for purposes of information c ~ l l e c t i o n . ~ ~  
The videodisc is thus more than an entertainment medium. 
Potentially it is a new communications medium. As such it stands 
alongside viewdata, personal computers and cable television as one 
of the new media which are competing in the race to produce 
domestic information/entertainment systems. While it may lack the 
long-term potential of other technologies which draw more on 
telecommunications and computing facilities the videodisc is a 
powerful medium. The prospect of its eventual integration into 
home information systems, wherein it will serve as a video library, is 
real. 
Machinery is accomplishing in the world what man has failed to 
do by preaching, propaganda, or the written word. 
Henry Ford 
This article has deliberately taken a broad and sweeping perspec- 
tive in order to point to the convergence and integration of what 
might otherwise be taken for disparate products. It has tried to 
interpret the significance of developments in 'information techno- 
logy' in a way that is opposed to the idealism of futurists and 
post-industrialists who seem oblivious to the real relations of power 
underpinning their 'information age'. We can agree with these 
thinkers that information is becoming an increasingly important 
phenomenon: but there will be no society based on information. 
Analyses which suggest such a scenario do so only by overlooking 
the practical social contexts from and in which information is 
produced and situated. 
O n  the other hand, it is our belief that these newly emerging 
phenomena cannot be adequately thought out if it is assumed that 
they can be pigeon-holed in different 'levels' of the 'social forma- 
tion'. Are business information systems a part of the 'economic' 
level, while domestic systems belong to some 'ideological' (or 
'cultural') sphere? What in the past has been called base and 
superstructure are now tightly interwoven, an organic unity. T o  
define, a przorz, 'culture' and 'economy' as external to each other, to 
assume the structural autonomy of culture, is to close one's theory to 
a reality that is subverting it. 
Recent developments in 'information technology' need to be 
historicized, that is, put into social and historical context. What is 
especially important is that, although they have a complex pre- 
history, it is now, in the period of crisis and recession of the 1970s, 
that they are really beginning to take shape. In our view this is 
primarily because 'information technology', and more generally the 
micro-electronics technology on which it is based, represents a 
possible solution to the present crisis. Potentially 'information 
technology' could provide a foundation for a new cycle of produc- 
tion, a new phase of accumulation. Moreover, it is by theorizing 
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'information technology' in relation to this process of accumulation 
that one is able to situate it in a substantive context. Thereby it 
becomes an integral component of a real social process which is the 
history of capital, rather than being related to some abstraction 
called the 'economic' or.'capitalism'. 
'Information technology' will play a central role in generating a 
new cycle of capital and consumer goods. But this process cannot be 
taken to be merely an 'economic' activity. Accumulation is a 'real 
life process' which expresses all social relations (those of both work 
and of leisure). It is that 'organic set of social relations whose 
evolution is the condition for perpetuating the wage It 
embraces the labour process (ways of working, structures of 
authority, etc.). the kinds of consumption it requires (in recent years 
most obviously in the form of mass consumption), and the social 
relations and lifestyles that support it. Aglietta has stressed that 
Fordism-the phase of accumulation now in crisis-cannot be 
regarded as merely a technical form of the labour process, but it is in 
, fact 'an articulation between process of production and mode of 
consumption'.78 This is of course to take up the insights of Gramsci 
on Americanzsm and Fordzsrn. Gramsci recognized that accumulation is 
a total social process, arguing that if Fordism is to be established, 
then 'a long process is needed . . during which a change must take 
place in social conditions and in the way of life and habits of 
 individual^'.^^ The history of accumulation is not an economic 
record, but the history of a whole series of social changes. 
It is not by chance that we mention here the name of Henry Ford. 
For the phase of accumulation that is presently taking shape will 
supersede, yet extend and elaborate, that initiated by Fordism. That 
is, against those post-industrialists who argue that 'information 
technology' marks the end of a certain kind of society, we see it as 
actually a continuation of capitalist organization. In particular it 
extends and refines the Fordist variant. Central to this continuity 
with Fordism is the question of machinery, by which is meant 'the 
historical reshaping of the traditional, inherited means of labour into 
a form adequate to capital'?O Machinery, especially since the days 
of Fordism and increasingly today, is the means of mediating the 
social relations of production. 
As we have said, technology which adopts micro-electronic 
devices will provide a major contribution to a new phase of 
accumulation. The reason for this is that it is a 'heartland' 
technology which will give 'leverage' to almost all industrial 
sectors.8' A central part in any attempt to restructure production 
will be played by 'information technology'. The latter is axiomatic 
for many reasons. One factor is that it constitutes a massive 
potential market for suppliers of 'information technology', recent 
estimates predicting as much as a 30 per cent annual growth in sales 
for particular pr0ducts.~2 Also very important will be the ability of 
'information technology' to introduce mechanization into areas that 
have not previously been characterized by automation. Technologi- 
cal 'efficiency' introduced into offices, libraries, government and 
administration will necessarily incur similar sorts of reorganization, 
deskilling, routinization, rationalization, and alienation that have 
become a feature of productive industries such as manufacturing. 
Above all, perhaps, the integration of computers and telecom- 
munications at the heart of 'information technology7 will extend 
and intensify the already advanced separation of mental and 
manual labour. If Taylor attempted the 'deliberate gathering in on 
the part of those on the management's side of all the great mass of 
traditional knowledge which in the past has been in the heads of the 
workmen . . . '83; and if Henry Ford refined this principle by 
investing machinery, rather than managers, with this knowledge; 
then we may say of 'information technology' that it will carry this 
principle to new sectors of industry and administration. And we can 
even go further, to suggest that potentially 'information technology' 
is tending towards the imposition of a similar principle beyond the 
limits of the factory and office and on to the scale of society as a 
whole. That is, we can perhaps say that we are moving towards a 
situation in which 'general social knowledge' is being absorbed into 
the machinery of 'information technology'. As we witness the 
enroachment of the control culture, government information and 
private data banks on to an increasingly observed public we are 
perhaps experiencing a shift to 'rationalized' practices far beyond 
the workplace. 
We have shown that 'information technology' will also develop in 
the domestic sector. Products originating as enhancements of the 
television will provide a new generation of electronics consumer 
durables, facilitating an extension and intensification of media 
consumption. Inevitably these products will provide electronic 
channels into the home for advertising, consumer information, 
electronic selling and electronic publishing. On this basis the speed 
and efficiency with which commodities and capital circulate will be 
increased. And so too will domestic information/entertainment 
systems extend that 'mobile privatization' that, for Raymond 
Williams, characterizes the present broadcasting media. The roseate 
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picture of the consumer participating in politics, education, etc., 
from the comfort of his living room ought not deflect us from the 
fact that this 'interaction' will take place in a context which forms 
part of a growing privatization of life, Moreover, this process itself 
must be gauged against the increasing centralization of information 
ushered in by the organizations and interests which are developing 
and exploiting 'information technologies'. 
Domestic and business information systems will tend to converge. 
It is clear that such convergence will develop under the dominance 
of business systems, which will assimilate consumer systems (e.g., 
Prestel) and extend their own networks (e.g., EFT, electronic mail) 
in so far as it is to their advantage. This convergence will do little to 
break down the separation of, on the one hand, increasingly 
centralized private and governemt data networks handling 'sensi- 
tive' and 'valuable' police, military, or business information, and, on 
the other hand, publicly accessible networks which handle commer- 
cial and comparatively less important information. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the success of 'information 
technology' as a resolution for the current crisis is not assured. It will 
depend on a number of factors, not least capital's ability to 
co-ordinate the possibilities for developing productivity and 
strengthening control over social relations. IBM for one acknow- 
ledges that the successful implementation of this technology is not 
guaranteed. They not only have to contend with fierce competitors, 
but also-and in the long term much more problematical-with an 
unpredictable public which can be awkward in matters of social 
control. 
Recognizing this, IBM have started offering history lessons. 
Anticipating and addressing suspicions and fears felt about the 
introduction of 'information technology' a recent advertisement tells 
us that 'Between the years 18 1 1 and 18 16, a band of textile workers 
had just the answer to the threat of technology. They literally threw 
spanners in the works.' We are told that 'the action of the Luddites 
carries a very instructive lesson' as regards recent technological 
innovation. 
Such a public relations campaign undermines opposition (and 
potential opposition) by asserting that the choice is a stark one 
between an unconstructive dismissal of invention or acceptance of 
'progress'. Defining this 'progress' IBM distorts both past and 
present: the vista becomes one of neutral technology, inevitable 
advance, harmony . . . In short, no choice at all. A first step in 
opposition is to lay bare the real interests which are disguised by the 
rhetorics of 'progress'. Our article, we hope, has added to the 
analyses which probe the rationales behind the introduction of 
'information technology'. Much more difficult will be the transition 
from theoretical accounts to practical encounters with the new 
technologies in everyday situations. 
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